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5This report explores evidence and insights from five case studies that have made significant recent 
progress in addressing the challenge of insuring poor smallholder farmers and pastoralists in the 
developing world. In India, national index insurance programmes have reached over 30 million farmers 
through a mandatory link with agricultural credit and strong government support. In East Africa (Kenya, 
Rwanda and Tanzania), the Agriculture and Climate Risk Enterprise (ACRE) has recently scaled to reach 
nearly 200,000 farmers, bundling index insurance with agricultural credit and farm inputs. ACRE has 
built on strong partnerships with regional initiatives such as M-PESA mobile banking. In Ethiopia and 
Senegal, the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative has scaled unsubsidized index insurance to over 20,000 poor 
smallholder farmers who were previously considered uninsurable, using insurance as an integral part of a 
comprehensive risk management portfolio. With strong public and private sector support, the Mongolia 
Index-Based Livestock Insurance Project (IBLIP) insures more than 15,000 nomadic herders and links 
commercial insurance with a government disaster safety net. Finally, the Index-Based Livestock Insurance 
(IBLI) project in Kenya and Ethiopia demonstrates innovative approaches to insuring poor nomadic 
pastoralists in challenging circumstances. 
A few common features appear to have contributed to recent progress within these case studies:   
• explicitly targeting obstacles to improving farmer income; 
• integration of insurance with other development interventions; 
• giving farmers a voice in the design of products;  
• investing in local capacity; and 
• investing in science-based index development. 
Evidence from these case studies can inform the ongoing debate about the viability of scaling up 
index-based insurance for vulnerable smallholder farmers in the developing world. The rapid progress 
observed in recent years suggests that index insurance has the potential to benefit smallholder farmers 
at a meaningful scale, and suggests the need to reassess arguments that lack of demand and practical 
implementation challenges prevent index-based insurance from being a useful tool to reduce rural 
poverty.
Executive summary
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In recent years, index insurance has been presented as an 
important tool that can allow smallholder farmers to better 
manage climate risk, enabling investment and growth in the 
agricultural sector. Index insurance differs from traditional 
indemnity insurance, where payouts are explicitly based on 
measured loss for a specific client. Instead, in index insurance, 
farmers can purchase coverage based on an index that is 
correlated with those losses, such as wind speed, the amount 
of rain during a certain window of time (weather-based 
indices) or average yield losses over a larger region (area 
yield indices). Payouts are then triggered when this index falls 
above or below a pre-specified threshold. This means that 
index insurance is not designed to protect farmers against 
every peril, but is instead designed for situations where 
there is a larger scale, or regional risk (in the case of area 
yield insurance), or a well-defined climate risk (in the case of 
weather-based index insurance) that significantly influences a 
farmer’s livelihood. 
Index insurance has the potential to build the resilience of 
smallholder farmers, not only by providing a payout in bad 
years to help farmers survive and protect their assets; but also 
by helping to unlock opportunities that increase productivity 
in the non-payout years, which might allow them to escape 
from poverty traps or from the threat of them. For example, 
insurance might allow farmers to access credit, which they 
can then use to invest in new agricultural technologies or 
inputs. This could allow the farmers to use their increased 
profits to pay for the insurance premium, knowing that the 
insurance would allow them to repay their loan in the event of 
a climate shock.
There are several reasons why index insurance might be 
selected over its traditional indemnity counterpart, especially 
for smallholder farmers in developing countries. In indemnity 
insurance, the contract payout is dependent on the crop 
outcome on the client’s farm. If the crops fail then the farmer 
can claim a payout, which naturally leads to a powerful 
incentive to allow crops to fail, called moral hazard. Adverse 
selection is an equally difficult issue to solve, where clients’ 
demand for insurance is positively correlated with their risk 
of loss (higher risk clients tend to buy more insurance). Both 
of these phenomena lead to increased premiums in order 
for the insurance company to account for the increased risk 
of a payout. Premiums are also raised if there are logistical 
difficulties in sending a qualified assessor to the insured 
farms. This might be possible for a few large farms, but 
quickly becomes expensive and impractical when applied to a 
developing country with many small farms and poor transport 
infrastructure. As a result, agricultural indemnity insurance is 
often prohibitively expensive for smallholder farmers, infeasible 
for insurance companies, and is almost non-existent in 
low-income countries. Although agricultural insurance is a 
very substantial business sector in regions such as the USA, 
Europe and Australia with a premium income in 2008 of over 
USD20 billion (Mahul and Stutley 2010), multi-peril indemnity 
crop insurance has only been possible for the majority of 
farmers with extensive government subsidy (Glauber 2004). 
Hail and named peril agricultural insurance have developed 
unsubsidized markets in these regions however.
Index insurance largely overcomes these problems. As a 
payout is determined by an objective index, such as the 
amount of water falling into a rain gauge or the state of 
vegetation recorded by a satellite, the need to verify losses 
through individual farm visits is eliminated, leading to 
significantly reduced administration costs. In addition, index 
insurance is more resistant to moral hazard and adverse 
selection, which again leads to lower premiums. In this case, 
a payout does not depend on the state of the farmers’ fields 
and so the farmers who benefit most are those who can keep 
their crops alive in an adverse year. Finally, index insurance is 
not designed to cover every risk or a farmer’s entire livelihood, 
but instead protecting them from a clearly defined hazard. 
This again leads to more affordable premiums because the 
insurance company is able to quantify more accurately the 
probabilities of payout and is covering less risk. These factors 
have led many to suggest that index insurance might allow 
smallholder farmers access to the insurance market and that it 
could become a key tool in the fight against poverty.
However, there are still many limitations of index insurance. 
The very disconnect between on-farm losses and payouts 
which prevents moral hazard, is also one of the greatest 
challenges for index insurance. A weather index by its very 
definition is not directly insuring a farmer’s loss, and multiple 
farmers, who will typically have somewhat different losses, 
must often be covered by the same index formula and data 
source. Farmers may receive a payout even when their crops 
survive, or they may experience losses when a payout is 
not triggered. This phenomenon is called “basis risk” and 
has been cited frequently as a key barrier in index insurance 
uptake (Miranda and Farrin 2012; Clarke et al. 2012; Cole 
2012; Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Carter et al. 2014). A basis 
risk event might occur for many reasons: the index formula 
may not exactly reflect real world farmer losses; index 
measurements from weather stations, satellites, and other 
sources may not be precise enough to reflect a farmer’s 
losses; or conditions on a particular farm may be caused by 
something that wasn’t covered by the insurance. For example, 
1. Introduction
7pest-related losses would not be covered by drought 
insurance. 
Thus for an index insurance project to be successful, an 
index must be robustly designed so that it protects a farmer 
against the targeted risk and correlates well with losses. This 
often needs significant input from agricultural and scientific 
experts to answer questions such as “how can we measure 
drought?” or “how far from a rain-gauge does a farm have 
to be before the index isn’t appropriate?” The very nature of 
index insurance means that basis risk can never be removed 
in its entirety, thus good communication is also needed with 
clients so that they understand the covered risk and can plan 
for the possibility of a basis risk event. Building these links 
between insurance companies, reinsurers, scientists and 
the clients is not a trivial task. In addition, the index must be 
easily measurable, easily accessible, tamper proof and with a 
clearly quantified uncertainty in order to be priced. Finally and 
importantly, there are often limitations in distribution networks 
due to poor infrastructure, limited supply chains, lack of 
liquidity and poor communication, especially when working 
with smallholder farmers in developing countries. Farmers 
must be able to access, afford and understand their contracts 
before they will buy them.
It is important to stress that because of the diversity of risks 
and constraints faced by farmers in different situations, index 
insurance (or indeed any risk management product) can never 
have universal application. Weather-based index insurance 
in particular is only appropriate if there is an obvious, easily 
measureable and quantifiable climate risk (e.g., a deficit in 
rainfall at the start of the season). Further, there needs to be a 
demonstrable benefit in buying insurance, which is one reason 
why insurance is often bundled with credit or inputs which can 
demonstrate productivity gains. 
There have been many pilot index insurance programmes over 
the last 20 years. However, until recently, some have doubted 
that index insurance could overcome these challenges and 
scale to the numbers of farmers needed to meaningfully 
address poverty (Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Binswanger-
Mkhize 2012). In addition, despite many studies and reviews 
of index insurance (e.g., Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Mirinda 
and Farrin 2012; Cole et al. 2012; Helmuth et al. 2009; Carter 
et al. 2014), current information in the academic literature on 
index insurance programmes and particularly evidence of their 
impacts is quite limited, due in part to their commercial nature.
The aim of this report is two-fold. First, it updates previous 
assessments of index-based agricultural insurance in the 
developing world, providing concrete evidence from a few 
initiatives that are starting to overcome the challenges, and 
demonstrate substantial demand and tangible development 
impacts among farmers previously considered difficult to 
insure. Second, it draws out lessons from these case studies 
about factors that appear to contribute to the degree of 
success of these case studies. In the first part of the report, 
we discuss five case studies that insure smallholder farmers 
or pastoralists in the developing world. The second part of 
the report is a discussion of the evidence from these case 
studies about the potential for index-based insurance to 
benefit smallholder farmers in the developing world, and the 
strategies that they have employed in order to scale.
CCAFS Report No. 14
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8Table 1 gives a snapshot of the five case studies selected, 
and their current scope in terms of targeted commodities, 
coverage, number of insured people and key features. 
Four of these were selected because of their scale (at least 
10,000 contracts sold in 2013). The fifth case study, IBLI, 
was selected because of quantified developmental impacts 
and innovations that may prove useful for other projects. All 
include relatively poor smallholder farmers or pastoralists. 
Each of the case studies shows elements of success in their 
implementation, uptake and development benefits.
Table 1. Summary of index insurance case studies 
Case study Country Commodities Start  
date
Number of insured Key features
NAIS 
National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme  
mNAIS  
modified National 
Agricultural Insurance 
Scheme  
WBCIS  
Weather-Based Crop 
Insurance Scheme
India Cereals, millets, pulses, 
oilseeds, annual commercial 
horticulture
1999 16.79 million under NAIS,  
3 million under mNAIS  
13.62 million under WBCIS  
(2013)
State-subsidized 
insurance programmes, 
bringing insurance 
to millions of farmers 
through a link with 
agricultural credit.
ACRE  
Agriculture and Climate 
Risk Enterprise 
(formerly Kilimo 
Salama)
Kenya, 
Rwanda, 
Tanzania
Maize, beans, wheat, sorghum, 
coffee, potatoes
2009 Over 187,466  
60% in Kenya, 40% in Rwanda 
(2013)
Strong links to 
aggregators and mobile 
technology. Wide range 
of products, mostly 
linked to credit or inputs.
R4  
Rural Resilience 
Initiative  
(formerly HARITA)
Ethiopia, 
Senegal
Teff, beans, maize, wheat, 
barley, sorghum, millet
2009 24,133 in 82 villages in Ethiopia 
1989 in Senegal  
(2014)
A farmer-led, integrated 
risk management project, 
with labour for insurance 
and satellite rainfall 
indexes.
IBLIP  
Index-Based Livestock 
Insurance Project
Mongolia Livestock (camels, cattle, 
sheep, goats and horses)
2006 Approximately 15,000 herders 
(2014)
A public-private 
partnership with 
innovative risk layering, 
within a diversified risk 
management portfolio.
IBLI 
Index-Based Livestock 
Insurance
Kenya Livestock  
(camels, cattle, sheep, goats)
2010 Approximately 3000 contracts 
sold during the project lifetime
Creative education 
methodologies and 
an innovative mortality 
index-based on NDVI.
Scaling up index insurance for smallholder farmers
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index-based insurance schemes
Agriculture is an extremely important part of India’s economy, 
accounting for over 50% of employment. India also has 
approximately 138 million farm holdings, of which 85% are 
smallholder farmers (<2 ha) exposed to high climatic risk 
(Ministry of Agriculture 2014; Joseph 2013). It is therefore 
unsurprising that both weather-based and area yield index 
insurance have a long heritage in India, with the concept first 
reported in 1920 (Chakravarti 1920). India now administers the 
world’s largest weather index insurance market, reaching tens 
of millions of farmers each year. 
Given the history and scale of Indian crop insurance, there 
have been many studies and reviews on the topic (e.g., AFC 
2011; Clarke et al. 2012; Prabhakar et al. 2012; Rao 2011; 
Singh 2010; World Bank 2011a). Without attempting to 
capture this rich body of work, we present a short overview 
of the Indian index insurance market, plus some insights into 
why and how it has scaled. To do this, we focus on India’s 
major nation-wide index insurance programmes: the National 
Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS), which has now partly 
been replaced by the modified National Agricultural Insurance 
Scheme (mNAIS), and the Weather-Based Crop Insurance 
Scheme (WBCIS). These programmes are state sponsored 
and the choice to offer NAIS, its replacement mNAIS, or the 
WBCIS is a decision taken by the regional state authorities 
rather than individual smallholder farmers. The programmes are 
also supported through premium subsidy. Premium subsidies 
vary by insurance programme and by state, but in general the 
farmer pays between 25% and 40% of the premium and the 
government provides a subsidy for the remaining 60% to 75% 
(Aon Benfield 2013).
National Agriculture Insurance Scheme (NAIS)
The Government of India launched NAIS in 1999, as the 
successor of the Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme 
(CCIS) that had been running since 1985. In states or union 
territories that choose to participate in NAIS, insurance for food 
crops, oilseeds and selected commercial crops is compulsory 
for all farmers that take Seasonal Agricultural Operations (SAO) 
credit from financial institutions and is voluntary for non-
borrowing farmers without SAO credit. The index is primarily 
an area yield product at sub-district scale, thus payouts are 
triggered if regional yield measurements fall below a pre-
specified threshold. The state-sponsored Agriculture Insurance 
Company of India (AIC) covers the claim up to the premium, 
then the local and national governments contribute equally to 
cover the remainder. For commercial crops, the premium rates 
are actuarial, and the government does not subsidize claims.
Modified NAIS (mNAIS)
Difficulties in the administration and financing of NAIS led to 
systemic delays in the settlement of claims (up to 9-12 months 
or more) and poor risk classification, resulting in adverse 
selection and inequity between farmers in nearby insurance 
units (World Bank 2011a). In September 2010, the Government 
of India approved a plan to move from the NAIS into a modified 
NAIS (mNAIS) programme under an actuarial regime in 50 
districts. NAIS was to be completely withdrawn as of 2014 but 
the new national government allowed regional governments to 
continue NAIS in 2014-15. The regional governments therefore 
had a choice of NAIS, mNAIS or WBCIS for the 2014-15 
growing seasons.
Modifications from NAIS to mNAIS included: changing 
the governments financial liability into up-front subsidy on 
premiums, reducing the insurance unit size to village level to 
lower basis risk, elimination of calamity years in calculating 
threshold yield, coverage for prevented sowing & post-harvest 
risks, plus additional coverage for failed planting based on 
weather indices (World Bank 2011a; Zevenbergen 2014). 
Weather-based Crop Insurance Scheme 
(WBCIS)
The Weather-based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS) was 
formally introduced in 2003 as a pilot, underwritten by ICICI-
Lombard General Insurance Company and insuring groundnut 
and castor farmers in BASIX’s water user associations in 
Andhra Pradesh. Other private sector pilots followed and by 
2007 the Government adopted it as an official alternative to 
NAIS. Around 40 crops are insured under the category for 
various climatic risks such as deficit rainfall, dry-spells, excess 
rainfall, low temperature, high temperature, high humidity, and 
high wind. As shown in Figure 1, the project now covers over 
13 million farmers.
CCAFS Report No. 14
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The primary product of WBCIS is based on weather data 
linked to one of the network’s 5000 reference weather 
stations. The limited availability and quality of ground-based 
weather data has been cited as a key bottleneck for further 
scale up (Parthasarathy 2014). One advantage for end-users 
of this product is that insurance payouts are provided within 
a reasonable time (mostly within 45 days) from the end of 
the season covered by the contract, whereas area yield 
estimates take substantially longer to calculate (Aon Benfield 
2013). WBCIS allows risk-based premium rates, supported 
by up-front subsidies in premium. Private sector insurance 
companies are allowed to compete with the Agriculture 
Insurance Company of India (AIC), the public insurer, to offer 
the subsidized products (Clarke et al. 2012).
Goals, accomplishments, and impact
The stated objectives of Indian index insurance (Ministry 
of Finance 2014) are to: (a) “provide a measure of financial 
support to farmers in the event of crop failure from drought, 
cyclone and incidence of pest & diseases;” (b) “restore the 
credit eligibility of a farmer for the next season after a crop 
failure;” (c) “encourage the farmers to adopt progressive 
farming practices, high value inputs and higher technology in 
agriculture;” and (d) “help stabilize farm incomes, particularly 
in disaster years.” The second and third objectives involve the 
relationship between insurance and farmers’ ability to access 
credit. Much of the scaling in these schemes can be attributed 
to requiring insurance as a prerequisite for agricultural credit, 
and high premium subsidy of up to 75% (Singh 2010). This 
allowed insurance to reach approximately 24% of farm 
households nationwide. This corresponds with a 2006 survey 
which found a 27% insurance take-up rate among a sample 
of farmers in Andhra Pradesh and a 23% rate by another 
sample in Gujarat, India (Cole et al. 2013). There is now a 
growing body of information on the types of farmer that have 
bought this insurance, although the size of India and the wide 
variation in wealth and infrastructure mean that the impact 
will almost certainly vary from region to region. A 2007 study 
(Giné et al. 2008), sampling approximately 750 households, 
showed that those who purchased index insurance as part of 
a crop credit package were generally poor to middle-income 
smallholder farmers. This was backed up by a smaller study 
of a sample of farmers in Maharashtra (Zevenburgen 2014). 
Finally, a randomized control experiment in Andhra Pradesh, 
India, showed that weather index insurance, associated with 
WBCIS, prompted a shift toward more profitable, higher risk 
farm production systems (Cole et al. 2013). 
The Zevenbergen (2014) impact study was conducted in 
the relatively wealthy region of Nashik, Maharashtra, where 
a survey of approximately 90 farmers showed that it is not 
necessarily the largest or most educated farmers that use crop 
insurance. The majority of insured farmers fell in the marginal 
farmer category (Figure 2). There was limited evidence to 
show that insured farmers were also more likely to have 
tractors and to apply more advanced farming techniques, 
potentially due to the crop credit bundled with the insurance. 
In addition, Rao (2013) conducted a study of over 600 farmers 
spread across eight districts of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and 
Madhya Pradesh, which revealed that farmers growing crops 
under irrigation were more likely to seek insurance compared 
to farmers growing crops under rainfed conditions. This was 
attributed to the higher working capital and higher returns 
from irrigated farms. Zevenbergen (2014) also showed that 
NAIS farmers in Nashik are keen for more input into the 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Marginal
< 2.5 acre
Small        
2.5-5.0 acre
Medium  
5.0-12.5 acre
Large
> 12.5 acre
Pe
rc
en
t 
of
 f
am
er
s
Farmer category
Insured
Non-insured
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Fa
rm
er
s 
in
su
re
d
(m
ill
io
ns
)
Year
WBCIS
mNAIS
NAIS
Scaling up index insurance for smallholder farmers
CCAFS Report No. 14
Figure 1. The number of farmers covered by India’s 
WBCIS, NAIS and mNAIS crop insurance programmes.  
Data from: Aon Benfield (2013) and Joseph (2013). 
Figure 2. Distribution of insured and non-insured farmers, by 
wealth category, from a survey of 88 farmers in Nashik district, 
Maharashtra. Data from Zevenbergen, 2014. 
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insurance design process. The study referenced a pilot DHAN 
Foundation mutual yield-based insurance programme in Tamil 
Nadu with high levels of satisfaction attributed to farmer-driven 
design. For example, the product was designed in conjunction 
with farmers and there was a democratic process in which 
farmers were chosen to represent their community within a 
formal feedback and assessment process. 
The mandatory nature of insurance for borrowing farmers 
makes it difficult to evaluate their motivation for buying NAIS 
and WBCIS insurance, or its impact on their livelihoods. 
For example, there is limited evidence to evaluate whether 
farmers are now more likely to avail crop credit because of the 
protection offered by the insurance. One method of addressing 
this is to look at the small proportion of farmers who voluntarily 
purchased insurance without also purchasing crop credit. 
Significant regional variation can be seen. For example, Swain 
(2014) reported that in 2009-2010, the percentage of non-
borrowing farmers varied from 0 15% across different states, 
and that non-borrowing farmers in the state of Odisha were 
more likely to choose WBCIS over NAIS. Other sources have 
suggested that this number is between 10-30% (AIC 2014). 
Kakumanu (2011) reported that awareness of the programme 
might also be a factor, with an awareness-raising effort by AIC 
significantly increasing demand for WBCIS by non-borrowing 
farmers.
There are of course caveats to interpreting demand by non-
borrowing farmers, especially if one attempts to compare 
them to a completely voluntary insurance programme. 
Farmers who purchase insurance in isolation from credit are 
likely to have different motivations or socio-economic status 
compared to those who purchase insurance bundled with 
credit. It is thus reasonable to speculate that the demand by 
non-borrowing farmers is not a complete reflection of demand 
for Indian index insurance in general. For example, there is 
some evidence to support the hypothesis that some farmers 
who purchased insurance bundled with credit would have 
otherwise been interested in voluntary, non-bundled insurance. 
This is shown in Zevenburgen (2014), which reported that 
farmers in Nashik district, Maharashtra wanted more access 
to voluntary insurance. In addition, it is reasonable to suggest 
that insurance offered without the bundle with credit is playing 
a different role in farmers’ risk management strategies, for 
example, it is more likely to protect assets or be used for 
safety-nets or consumption smoothing, whilst bundled 
insurance is more likely to be used to build productive assets. 
It is possible that these differing roles of the product might 
have a different impact on demand. 
The wide variety of programmes and contracts offered in India 
means that the issue of basis risk is often discussed as an 
important issue for Indian index insurance programmes. In the 
case of weather index-based WBCIS, many different index 
designs have been proposed (Clarke et al. 2012), but a lack 
of validation data has made it difficult to rigorously assess the 
level of basis risk or evaluate the alternatives. In the case of 
yield measurement used within NAIS and mNAIS, basis risk is 
due to the difference between aggregate area yield and yield 
on individual farmer’s plots. To address this, mNAIS scaled 
down the unit area of insurance from the sub-district level of 
NAIS, to individual villages or clusters of 4-5 villages, although 
no formal validation of the impact on basis risk has yet been 
reported.
WBCIS also provides an interesting example of public-
private sector interactions and partnerships. Weather-based 
index insurance in India was developed originally by the 
private sector, then adopted by the State and subsidized in 
2007. From 2009-2010, private sector firms were allowed 
to compete with the public insurer AIC to offer subsidized 
WBCIS products at a state level (Clarke et al. 2012). The 
future is likely to offer more changes to this public-private 
relationship as the Government is transitioning to a National 
Crop Insurance Programme (NCIP) where mNAIS, WBCIS and 
a pilot palm coconut insurance programme will be merged, 
the Government will change the method of providing subsidies 
to an actuarial approach and private sector firms will be 
allowed to compete for contracts (AIC 2014; Bhavan 2013, 
Parthasarathy 2014).
In conclusion, India provides evidence that it is possible 
to create logistical frameworks to insure many millions 
of individual farmers and that it is possible to scale up a 
programme where insurance is bundled with agricultural credit 
and subsidy. Many different index designs have also been used 
in the country, which allow insight into index design and basis 
risk. One of the strengths of the index insurance programmes 
in India is their flexibility in responding to new technology 
and evidence, where mNAIS is an excellent example of this 
progression.
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Case study 2: ACRE – East Africa
The Agriculture and Climate Risk Enterprise (ACRE) is the 
largest index insurance programme in the developing world 
in which the farmers pay a market premium, and the largest 
agricultural insurance programme in sub-Saharan Africa. It 
is also the first agricultural insurance programme worldwide 
to reach smallholders using mobile technologies (IFC 2013). 
ACRE was originally a project run by the Syngenta Foundation 
for Sustainable Agriculture called Kilimo Salama (Kiswahili for 
Safe Agriculture). It transitioned to its current form as a for-
profit social enterprise in June 2014. ACRE has shown rapid 
scale-up in East Africa (Figure 3), and is projected to reach 3 
million farmers across 10 countries by 2018 (ACRE 2014b). In 
2013, the sum insured reached USD12.3 million, the recorded 
insurance payout was USD370,405 and the average cost of 
insurance was 5-25% of harvest value (IFC 2014). Donor money 
is currently used for feasibility studies, satellite ground proofing 
with automatic weather stations, and salaries during the early 
stages of growth in each target country (ACRE 2014b). From 
2014 onwards, some donor money will also be directed into 
premium subsidies.
There are three pillars to ACRE’s approach (ACRE 2014b). First 
is a wide range of products based on several data sources, 
including automatic weather stations and remote sensing 
technologies. The second is ACRE’s role as an intermediary 
between insurance companies, reinsurers and distribution 
channels/aggregators. Such aggregators include microfinance 
institutions, agribusiness and agricultural input suppliers. The 
third pillar is its link to the mobile money market, particularly the 
M-PESA scheme in East Africa. This allows quick enrollment 
and payment of claims without having to physically visit farmers, 
thus enabling the programme to quickly reach the many millions 
of farmers enrolled in M-PESA.
As of 2013, ACRE offered a range of insurance products (ACRE 
2014a). First, insurance was linked to agricultural credit from 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). This credit was designed for 
farmers who wished to grow maize using improved inputs, thus 
the credit had to cover seed or mineral fertilizer and needed 
to be at least USD100. In 2013, 182,092 farmers purchased 
this package, which also included agronomic training from 
MFI field agents. Second, ACRE offered contract seed grower 
insurance for large-scale producers (> 20 acres) at an average 
value of US$650 per acre. In this case the seed company 
paid the premiums at the start of the season, which was then 
repaid by the farmers at harvest when delivering their seeds 
to the company. In 2013, 650 producers covered 11,814 
acres with this package. Third, dairy livestock insurance was 
offered in partnership with a dairy cooperative (for farmers 
who already own cattle) or lending institution (for farmers who 
want to purchase them). These partners pay the premium 
up-front, then either deduct it from the payments to farmers 
for milk deliveries, or combine it with the loan payments. The 
cover is also linked to animal care packages and vaccines. In 
2013, 58 dairy farmers bought this product, insuring 97 cows 
worth an average of US$400 each. Finally, in 2013 and 2014, 
insurance was incorporated into a replanting guarantee by a 
seed company, linking ACRE, UAP Insurance and Safaricom. 
The insurance premium was incorporated into the price of a 
bag of seed. Each bag contained a scratch card with a code 
that could be texted to ACRE during the planting period to start 
coverage against drought. Each farm was then monitored using 
satellite imagery for 21 days. If the index was triggered the 
farmers were automatically paid via M-PESA for a new bag of 
seed so that they could replant. In 2013, 2,279 farmers signed 
up to the service, and in the 2014 February-April planting 
season, over 9,000 bags of seed were sold and over 700 
farmers compensated (Safaricom 2014). 
There is growing evidence that ACRE is demonstrating positive 
development impact, including statistics that insured farmers 
had 16% more earnings and invested 19% more compared 
to their uninsured neighbours (IFC 2014). In 2012, 177,782 
farmers received USD8.4 million in financing in part due to 
ACRE’s index insurance products (some of the farmers may 
have been able to access this credit without the insurance). As 
with any bundled product, for example the Indian case-study, 
it is difficult to assess the motivation of farmers for purchasing 
insurance. In some cases, the insurance might have unlocked 
credit. But in other cases, farmers who already had access to 
credit also purchased insurance. An earlier unbundled product 
offered by Kilimo Salama via agri-businesses also showed 
strong scale-up from 200 farmers to over 7000, suggesting that 
the demand for insurance is not driven purely by the demand 
for credit, seed or other products (Goslinga 2012).
One of the strengths of ACRE is that indexes used for 
its products are based on several data sources, allowing 
experimentation with new technologies without degrading 
trust and its baseline of users. Data sources include 130 
solar powered automated weather stations, satellite rainfall 
measurements, and government area yield statistics. Indexes 
have been developed for maize, beans, wheat, sorghum, millet, 
soybeans, sunflowers, coffee, and potatoes (Nganga 2013). In 
Rwanda, more than 37,000 low-income smallholder farmers 
were able to purchase a satellite-based index insurance product 
(Fiondella 2013).
ACRE has cited its wide range of partners as a major reason 
behind their rapid scaling and demand. Partners include 
banks and MFIs, mobile network operators (Safaricom), seed 
companies, government agencies (Ministries of Agriculture and 
National Meteorological Services), research institutions including 
IRI, insurance and reinsurance companies (UAP in Kenya, 
Societé Rwandaise d’Assurance (SORAS) in Rwanda, Swiss 
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Re, Africa Re) and global donors (Global Index Insurance 
Fund, GIIF). ACRE has leveraged the expertise of this 
partner network to implement new and innovative solutions 
to challenges farmers face. It is supported by an “in house 
knowledge hub” of 30 local and international specialists to 
work on all aspects of the programme, from index design 
to distribution and farmer education. Farmer education and 
capacity development has been a key component of this 
work. In 2011, 40% of the project’s budget reportedly went 
towards trainers who work with farmers, a telephone helpline, 
and radio programmes about insurance (Rosenburg 2011).
ACRE is perhaps most well known for its distribution channels. 
Mobile banking is a key part of the East Africa economy, 
with over 19.3 million users of the M-PESA mobile banking 
system (Safaricom 2014). The partnership between ACRE 
and M-PESA has allowed both premiums and payouts to be 
paid instantly using mobile banking, plus the M-PESA system 
supports easy registration and tracking of individual clients. 
This link has enabled ACRE to reach many thousands of 
remote farmers while maintaining low transaction and delivery 
costs. Although there has been little formal investigation 
into the type of farmer purchasing ACRE products or their 
motivation, the link with M-PESA gives some indication. For 
example, in contrast to the IBLI case study, it is aimed at 
farmers who have access to a mobile phone or live within 
the mobile coverage area which is 91% of Kenya (Safaricom 
2014). 
In summary, this is an example of a project reporting rapid 
scaling based on a strong partnership between different 
partners and innovative approaches to address the differing 
needs of different farmers. It has particularly built on links with 
lending institutions and input providers, and with the M-PESA 
mobile banking community to allow easier payment and 
distribution. Finally, this programme gives one of the strongest 
demonstrations that innovative technology solutions can lead 
to scale in smallholder agricultural insurance.
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Figure 3. The number of farmers covered by 
the ACRE programme in East Africa. Data 
obtained from ACRE 2014. From 2009-2012, the 
programme operated in Kenya. In 2013, contracts 
were sold in Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda.
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Case study 3: R4 Rural 
Resilience Initiative – Ethiopia and 
Senegal
The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) is a strategic partnership 
between the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and Oxfam 
America. Its aim is to improve the resilience and food security 
of vulnerable rural households in the face of increasing climate 
risks. R4 refers to the four integrated risk management 
strategies implemented by the programme. The first is Risk 
Reduction: access to improved climate risk management, 
for example natural resource rehabilitation or new agricultural 
extension techniques. This is designed so that a drought 
year might have less of an impact on farmers. Second, Risk 
Reserves involves access to individual or group savings, so 
that farmers can build a financial base for investing in their 
livelihoods. Savings can also provide a buffer for short-term 
needs, increasing a household’s ability to cope with shocks. 
Group savings can be lend to individual participants with 
particular needs, providing a self-insurance mechanism for the 
community, or targeted at particular groups such as savings 
for women in Oxfam’s Savings For Change programme. 
Index-based insurance falls under the third strategy, Risk 
Transfer, and aims to transfer the component of risk (e.g., a 
major regional drought) that cannot be reduced in any other 
way. Finally, Prudent Risk Taking involves access to micro-
credit. Microfinance Institutions are often reluctant to offer 
credit to farmers because of the perceived high risk of default 
in bad seasons. The other R4 strategies allow farmers to 
have a stronger asset base and an ability to pay back a loan 
in a drought year, thus improving access to credit to allow 
investment in productive assets such as seeds, fertilizers and 
new technologies.
The R4 Initiative was initially called the Horn of Africa Risk 
Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) project, developed in Ethiopia 
2009 as a partnership between Oxfam America, the Relief 
Society of Tigray (REST), Ethiopian farmers, and several 
other national and global partners. HARITA transitioned into 
the R4 Initiative in 2011, and expanded its partnerships to 
include the World Food Programme, with the aim of adapting 
lessons learnt in Ethiopia to other countries. The programme 
has scaled solidly, from 200 Ethiopian farmers in the original 
2009 HARITA pilot in Tigray, to over 24,000 in Ethiopia (in 
81 villages) and 2,000 in Senegal in 2014 (Figure 4). The 
insurance component is notable for reaching a relatively large 
29% of the population on average, and up to 38% in some 
villages (Madajewicz et al. 2013). It is also notable for the fact 
that a large proportion of the scaling happened in 2011 after a 
relatively wet year with very few payouts. 
Future plans for scaling include expanding to Zambia and 
Malawi in 2015, plus further expanding the number of 
farmers enrolled in Ethiopia and Senegal. The project has 
a well-defined plan for scaling in each new country. The 
first year is known as a ‘dry run’ in which farmers and local 
experts are consulted, an initial index design is completed, 
economic research games are played, and intensive capacity 
development is completed at a farmer and an institutional 
level. This is followed in the second year by the rollout of 
the programme for several thousand farmers, plus further 
refinement and scaling in future years. The dry-run strategy 
has allowed the project to test insurance products in a 
controlled environment and learn farmer preferences between 
product options, prior to offering them through commercial 
outlets.
The R4 Initiative is deliberately targeted at poor smallholder 
farmers who were previously considered to be uninsurable due 
to a combination of poverty, lack of education, data limitations 
and remoteness. To overcome the liquidity constraint, poor 
farmers have the option of paying premiums either in cash or 
through insurance-for-work (IFW) programmes. In Ethiopia, 
the IFW scheme is built into the Government of Ethiopia’s 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). In other countries, 
it is built into WFP Food For Assets initiatives. In 2014, an 
option of paying for insurance through a combination of cash 
and labour was introduced to give farmers the opportunity to 
graduate from the IFW programmes. In addition to providing 
a means of insuring the poorest households without resorting 
to direct premium subsidy, the approach is also designed 
to complement other R4-strategies. For example, the IFW 
programmes employ farmers in community drought risk 
reduction activities identified through local participatory 
planning processes. Education about these activities was 
rated as one of the most important aspects of R4 in a recent 
impact review (Madajewicz et al. 2013). 
Several other development impacts were also reported 
(Madajewicz et al. 2013). On average, across all districts, 
insured farmers increased the amount of savings by an 
average of 123% compared to uninsured. The insured farmers 
tripled their savings from an average amount of 465 birr in 
2009. The insured farmers also increased the number of oxen 
they own by 25% since 2009. Some benefits varied among 
three districts evaluated. In one district, insured farmers 
increased their levels of grain reserves more than uninsured 
farmers. In a second district, insured farmers increased 
the number of oxen owned relative to the uninsured. The 
number of oxen declined slightly among the uninsured. In 
a third district, insured farmers increased the number of 
loans and amounts borrowed relative to the uninsured. The 
evidence showed that the programme benefitted vulnerable 
groups and particularly women farmers. For example, relative 
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to participating male-headed households, female-headed 
households increased their investments at a higher rate, 
took out more loans, decreased the amount of land that they 
sharecropped, increased their investments in hired labour, and 
increased their total planted land in response to insurance. 
One challenge facing the R4 Initiative is data availability. 
Because ground-based weather stations are extremely sparse 
in the R4 project area, several data sources were used in index 
design and validation. The R4 index is based on ARC2 satellite 
rainfall estimates, which were validated and back-stopped 
by a combination of other satellite rainfall and vegetation 
estimates, water-balance satisfaction indices, rainfall 
simulators and statistical tools that interpolate data from 
stations nearby (Stanimirova et al. 2013). As with any weather-
based index, reducing and appropriately communicating 
basis risk is also a challenge, especially as there are several 
non-drought perils faced by farmers in the region (such as 
insects or heat stress).  Risk assessment and context analysis 
has been key to facing this issue, which has taken time and 
meaningful investment by project partners. There has also 
been significant research with scientific partners into regions 
with recurrent basis risk, leading to current efforts to design 
hybrid index insurance products using a combination of 
satellite rainfall estimates and vegetation indices.
Central to this has been the development of a farmer-led 
index design process run using the Social Network for Index 
Insurance Design (SNIID). SNIID is a participatory approach to 
design a product that integrates local farmers’ and experts’ 
knowledge and expertise. A “design team” composed of 
community leaders and representatives, was established in 
each village and is regularly consulted. Aspects of the SNIID 
process include discussions about exactly what needs insuring 
and when, plus experimental economic risk simulations 
(‘games’) with the farmers to understand their preferences for 
key parts of the insurance contract, such as coverage and 
frequency of payouts. Alongside these information-gathering 
sessions, the R4 Initiative organizes financial education 
trainings and educational activities. This allows time to work 
with farmers on topics such as basis risk communication 
and community-based basis-risk strategies. In all of those 
activities, care was taken to understand gender dynamics and 
to ensure inclusion of appropriate gender strategies in risk 
reduction activities. 
Experimental research games were also played to ensure 
that the product properly reflected the farmers’ wishes 
(Norton et al. 2014). During this research, game participants 
exhibited clear preferences for insurance contracts with 
higher frequency payouts and for insurance over other risk 
management options, including high interest savings. The 
preference for higher frequency payouts was mirrored in 
commercial sales of the product, with commercial purchasers 
paying substantially higher premiums than the minimal, 
low frequency option available. This combined evidence 
challenges claims that the very poor universally choose 
minimal index insurance coverage and supports concerns 
that demand may outpace supply of responsible insurance 
products.
The R4 Initiative attributes its relative success in part to the 
strength of its institutional partnerships. The project has 
directly engaged organizations at all stages of the insurance 
process, including farmer groups, governments, banks, MFIs, 
local insurers, research institutions and international reinsurers. 
This has helped to build trust and develop an institutional 
landscape that enabled insurance to sustainably scale.
In summary, the R4 Initiative has demonstrated strong scale-
up while targeting farmers previously considered uninsurable. 
Its approach has combined strong and inclusive participatory 
processes, with strong institutional partnerships and scientific 
support. This has enabled it to reach highly vulnerable 
smallholder populations with index insurance, as one integral 
component of a diversified risk management strategy.
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Figure 4. The number of farmers 
covered by the R4 Initiative in Ethiopia 
and Senegal. Data obtained from R4 
Quarterly reports (R4 Rural Resilience 
Initiative 2014).
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Case study 4: Mongolia Index-
Based Livestock Insurance 
Project (IBLIP)
The Mongolian Index-Based Livestock Insurance Project 
(IBLIP) developed by the Government of Mongolia in 2005 with 
the support of the World Bank, is an index-based mortality 
livestock insurance product now available in every Mongolian 
province. The aim of IBLIP is to protect Mongolian herder 
households from significant livestock loss by providing financial 
security, while also encouraging them to adopt practices that 
build their resilience to extreme weather events. This case 
study offers insights into how insurance can be used for 
multiple purposes that include self-insurance, market-based 
insurance, and a social safety net. Similar to ACRE, this case 
study also shows how a donor supported index insurance 
programme can successfully transition into a commercial 
entity.
A number of challenges have affected Mongolian pastoralists 
in recent decades, including the transition from communist to 
free market economy. Because of the privatization of herds, 
several mild winters, and increasing urban unemployment the 
number of livestock roughly doubled between 1970 and 1999 
(Figure 6; Shagdar 2002). The collapse of the communist state 
also started a complex evolving dynamic between politics, 
culture, resource access, risk management and institutional 
change, resulting in rapidly increasing inequality among 
pastoralists (Murphy 2014). Withdrawal of state sponsored 
insurance and pastoral support services transferred risk from 
the Government to individual pastoralists.
The most important climate-related shock impacting 
Mongolian pastoralists is the dzud, where extreme winter 
weather conditions result in high livestock mortality. This 
hazard occurs approximately once every 5-8 years. It is 
important to note however that dzud events impact different 
wealth categories of herders quite differently. In 2013, 
14.5% of herder households were categorized as wealthy, 
owning more than 500 animals (Yadamsuren 2014). Murphy 
(2014) and Luxbacher and Goodland (2011) suggest that 
these households are able to mitigate the dzud livestock 
mortality rate through collective migration rights and better 
access to protective assets. The majority of herders have 
mid-sized herds, with 32.7% owning 200-500 animals and 
24.6% owning between 100-200 (Yadamsuren 2014).  These 
herders often lack the financial resources and financial 
capital to migrate, leaving them much more vulnerable to 
weather risk. Murphy (2014) found that these farmers were 
particularly susceptible to dzud events in the Uguumer 
region. Unsurprisingly, the poorest 28.2% of herders with 
fewer than 100 animals are also highly susceptible to dzud. 
Murphy (2014) reported that this risk might be ameliorated 
in some cases if the herders also worked as hired labour 
for the wealthy farmers, as this allows them to access risk 
management strategies for their own livestock such as 
migration. However, a survey of 1094 herders across 3 
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Figure 5. The number of farmers 
covered by the Mongolian Index-
Based Livestock Insurance Project 
(IBLIP). Numbers obtained from 
Yadamsuren (2014).
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provinces in western Mongolia reported that it was the poorest 
herders who suffered the heaviest losses from the 2010 dzud 
event (Bertram-Hümmer and Krähnert 2015). The possibility of 
a dzud winter appears to be a barrier to investing in improved 
practices such as upgrading animal quality (Miranda and Farrin 
2012, World Bank 2009a). 
IBLIP was developed in response to a perfect storm, between 
1999 and 2002, of increased livestock numbers, increased 
vulnerability, and a 3 consecutive dzud winters. This led to the 
loss of over 11 million animals, representing a financial loss of 
over USD500 million (Yadamsuren, personal comm, 2015).  It 
also led to an increase in the poverty rate from approximately 
30% in 2000 to over 40% in 2004 (CDKN 2013) and imposed 
strains on the Government of Mongolia’s budget for disaster 
relief (World Bank 2009b). The losses from these extreme 
weather events were so severe that the small agricultural 
indemnity insurance industry went bankrupt trying to pay out 
the farmers and herders, and the private insurance system 
collapsed, destroying the risk management systems that were 
in place. This event clearly showed the difficult nature of the 
problem for indemnity livestock insurance in Mongolia: losses 
were highly correlated, the frequency and severity of risk was 
uncertain and there was high risk of moral hazard. Finally, 
the nomadic nature of many of the farmers meant that there 
were high administrative costs and it was difficult to monitor 
individual behaviour. 
The index used in IBLIP is the livestock mortality rate at the 
local region (or soum) level. The coverage period is from 
January to May, when more than 80 percent of the livestock 
losses occur. The sales season is from April to June in the 
previous year. Each June, the National Statistical Office 
conducts a mid-year survey, which is compared with the 
previous end-of-the-year census, conducted in December, 
to determine the livestock mortality rate of adult animals. 
The livestock mortality rate was considered suitable for use 
as an index for IBLIP because farmers are incentivized to 
report accurate numbers through local belief systems and 
peer review, because data is available for over 40 years for 
all animals at a soum level, and because historical validation 
studies show that the index captured historical loss years 
(GlobalAgRisk 2012 Mahul and Skees 2007). As the IBLIP 
index is closely linked to loss, there have been very few basis 
risk events.
IBLIP is unique in its formal layering approach. When livestock 
mortality is <6%, farmers are encouraged to self insure, but 
are supported by World Bank risk management tools in the 
Sustainable Livelihood Project (Luxbacher and Goodland 
2011). When livestock mortality is 6-30%, farmers receive 
payouts from the Base Insurance Product (BIP), now called 
Livestock Risk Insurance (LRI), supported by the Livestock 
Insurance Indemnity Pool (LIIP). The LRI is sold to farmers at 
fully loaded, actuarially correct premium rates (Miranda and 
Farrell 2012). Herders select the percentage of the value of 
their herd that they would like to insure – typically about 30% 
(Rutten 2012). Reserves within the LIIP come from premiums 
and an insurer participation fee, and are used to make 
payments to herders. Finally, livestock losses that exceed 30% 
are covered by the Government of Mongolia’s Government 
Catastrophic Coverage (GCC) formally called the Disaster 
Response Product (DRP). The Mongolian Government also 
covers costs such as the livestock census, the management 
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Figure 6. Total number of livestock in 
Mongolia. Data from the Mongolian 
National Statistics Agency. The impact 
of dzud winter events of 2002 and 
2010 can clearly be seen. 
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of the risk management tools, and a subsidized reinsurance 
treaty (Mahul et al. 2009). The GCC is financed through the 
reinsurance treaty, with international donor funds coming 
through the World Bank. Herders could access stand-alone 
GCC coverage up to 2008/2009, but it is now only available 
bundled with LRI (Rutten 2012, Luxbacher and Goodland 
2011). The public-private risk-layering strategy is a new 
innovation for index insurance and has been an effective 
element of the project. Government coverage of catastrophic 
mortality events reduces risk premiums for herders and 
protects the insurance industry from risk of bankruptcy.
Since its inception in 2005, IBLIP has been widely regarded as 
a success with solid scale up at a similar rate to the R4-Rural 
Resilience project. In 2014, growth appears to have slowed 
or slightly reversed. However, IBLIP still covers approximately 
15,000 farmers and is available in every district of Mongolia. 
Herders also continued to purchase the insurance during a 
price decline of cashmere, suggesting that policy holders 
value the coverage (Luxbacher and Goodland 2011). Payouts 
were triggered during several of the years, particularly the 
severe dzud of 2010 and the administrative mechanisms 
proved effective in getting payouts to the farmers. This scaling 
has been attributed to the strong partnership between the 
private and public sector and because the historical mortality 
rates are available across the country. The scaling also 
appears to be financially sustainable, with several insurance 
and reinsurance companies attracted to the project. 
Initial assessments suggest that IBLIP is having a positive 
impact on reducing the poverty of smallholder farmers, 
although there is significant regional variation. Luxbacher and 
Goodland 2011) reported that banks have been recorded 
offering lower loan interest rates to insured farmers. Murphy 
(2011) found that in Uguumur, farmers who received payouts 
were able to use them to cover the costs of migration for 
future years, but that in this region it was often just the 
wealthy or very wealthy farmers purchasing premiums, further 
exacerbating inequality. A similar result was also found in 
western Mongolia in 2013; below 200 livestock: 14% of 
herders bought IBLI, between 200-350 livestock: 15% of 
herders bought IBLI, above 350 livestock: 32% of herders 
bought IBLI (Bertram-Hümmer and Krähnert 2015). 
There were also indications that in some regions of the 
country, middle wealth farmers are primarily purchasing the 
insurance, leading to positive impacts on inequality. For 
example, Fernandez-Gimenez et al. (2012) found that in 
2010-2011, soums showing strong links between the local 
government and herder organizations were more likely to 
widely take up insurance and were generally considered 
resilient, whereas soums with weak institutions were at that 
point less likely to access the insurance with only the wealthy 
taking advantage. Addison and Brown (2014) found high 
demand from sampled farmers across the region during the 
2009-2010 dzud event who had not yet bought the insurance 
due to access (addressed in the subsequent scale up). 
Access and knowledge of the project are now much higher. In 
2014, 82.3% were reported as being aware of the insurance 
programme in the first 4 soums involved in the project, 62.5% 
in the second 11 soums, and 51.7% in the most recently 
added 6 soums (World Bank 2014). 
The success of IBLIP is reflected by its announcement in 
2014 that it was transitioning from a donor-funded project to a 
private company. In June 2014, a draft Index-Based Livestock 
Insurance Law was passed and followed in August by the 
creation of the Agricultural Reinsurance Company of Mongolia 
(Yadamsuren 2014). This has been designed as a public-
private owned reinsurance company which is fully compliant 
with Mongolian and international insurance and reinsurance 
legislation. Current funding for IBLIP from the World Bank will 
continue until 2016 during the transition period (World Bank 
2014). 
As IBLIP moves forwards, new technical challenges are being 
overcome. For example, there are discussions to reduce 
administrative costs and the logistical barrier of physically 
reaching pastoralists through working with trusted partners 
such as banks and microfinance agencies, rather than directly 
employing insurance agents to sell premiums (CDKN 2013). 
IBLIP can also contribute still further to poverty reduction in 
Mongolia, especially if it can strengthen its links to initiatives 
addressing other problems or increasing inequalities that 
pastoralists face, such as a lack of markets or poorly 
developed supply chains (Luxbacher and Goodland 2011). It 
will also need to find its place within the rapidly changing flux 
of land tenure rights and cultural shifts amongst Mongolian 
pastoralists (Murphy 2014). In general, however, there is great 
potential for further positive impact.
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Case study 5: Index-Based 
Livestock Insurance (IBLI) – 
Kenya and Ethiopia
The arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) of northern Kenya and 
southern Ethiopia are regularly hit by regional droughts. These 
can have particularly severe impact on pastoralist households, 
who depend on livestock for food, income, and as their main 
form of savings. As Wandera and Mude (2013) discuss, loss 
of herds during drought can have devastating effects on 
local communities, pushing many households into poverty 
traps. This makes pastoralists amongst the most vulnerable 
population to climate in East Africa. The International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), in partnership with Cornell 
University and the University of California – Davis, created 
IBLI to stabilize asset accumulation, enhance economic 
growth, and keep livestock keepers out of poverty traps by 
insuring them against the loss of their livestock due to drought 
(Mude et al. 2010). The product is based on two years 
of comprehensive research that was aimed at designing, 
developing and implementing market-mediated, index-based 
insurance products that livestock keepers – particularly in the 
ASALs – could purchase to protect themselves from drought-
related asset losses (Mude et al. 2010, Chantarat et al. 2013).
The IBLI project took on the challenge of making insurance 
commercially viable amongst poor nomadic herders who 
occupy vast remote areas in Kenya and Ethiopia with almost 
non-existent communication and transport options (Ndirangu 
2014). It also lacked the comprehensive 100-year mortality 
database that was used in Mongolia’s livestock insurance 
programme. These challenges led the IBLI team to research 
innovative strategies and use new technologies in product 
design, for example using a statistical relationship between 
livestock mortality data (collected since the year 2000) and 
the remotely sensed Normalized Difference Vegetation Index 
(NDVI). IBLI has features including creative education methods 
for pastoralists, culturally specific products and a division-
level mortality index. Since 2000, households in northern 
Kenya have also been surveyed to gather livestock mortality 
data, providing a useful calibration tool. Although it hasn’t 
reached the scale of the other case studies in this report, IBLI 
is included because it has shown significant innovation in 
product design and implementation, and has demonstrated 
developmental impacts for poor pastoralists, under particularly 
challenging conditions. It also provides a useful comparison 
with IBLIP. 
The programme was launched in Marsabit in northern Kenya 
in January 2010 and now reaches three regions in northern 
Kenya (Marsabit, Isiolo and Wajir), plus the Borana region 
of southern Ethiopia. As with the other case studies in this 
work, there are multiple partners involved in the programme, 
including insurance companies, reinsurers, research 
organizations and NGOs who are assisting in identifying and 
training local communities in the initiative. 
The IBLI index is based on NDVI data collected by satellites, 
which was found to have a high correlation with forage 
availability in the project area (Mude et al. 2010; Wandera 
and Mude 2013). As the livestock in East African pastoral 
production systems depend almost entirely on forage for their 
nutrition, NDVI functions as an indicator of the vegetation 
available in the area for the livestock to consume and is linked 
to mortality. In Kenya, an index was calibrated using data on 
livestock mortality that the Arid Lands Resource Management 
Programme (now the NDMA) has been collecting monthly 
since 2000. The index was then based on the relationship 
between predicted livestock mortality and forage availability. 
The client can choose the level of risk coverage (either a 10% 
or 15% trigger/deductible contract).
Due to a lack of livestock data, the index in Borana, Ethiopia, 
uses the cumulative deviation (from normal conditions) of area 
aggregate observations of satellite-based vegetation index 
(NDVI) over the coverage rangelands within a given boundary. 
The Ethiopian contract triggers a payout when cumulative 
deviation of NDVI falls below the 15th percentile of historical 
vegetation growth over a season (two seasons in a year that 
combines a long rain period and the subsequent long dry 
period, or a short rain period and the subsequent short dry 
period). 
IBLI has reached more than 4000 pastoralists since its 
inception in 2010 (MacMillan 2014). Evaluation by Janzen 
and Carter (2013) found strong evidence that IBLI provides 
substantial immediate development benefits in the event 
of a payout, as participating households are less likely to 
sell livestock, more likely to buy livestock from others, and 
more likely to become self-reliant for food consumption. 
The report also found different behaviours depending on the 
farmer’s original asset base, with insurance stopping those 
most likely to reduce their productive assets from doing so, 
while preventing those households most likely to reduce 
consumption from doing so (Janzen and Carter 2013). People 
with larger payouts planned to save some of the money, 
or replenish their depleted herds while prices were still low. 
Some even increased herd sizes utilizing the low livestock 
prices. Insured households were half as likely to sell livestock 
after receiving a payout. Finally, household modelling indicated 
that IBLI removes 25-40% of total livestock mortality risk 
(Chantarat et al. 2013). 
Although women do not have ownership rights over livestock 
and rarely attended public meetings or elders meetings, where 
most of the information was disseminated, they bought more 
cover than men (Wandera et al. 2013). In the Marsabit region, 
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40% of people purchasing insurance were women (ILRI 2014). 
This was attributed to the fact that women: (a) have more 
liquidity as they participate in petty trade, (b) may be more 
risk adverse, and (c) tend to be more willing to adopt new 
innovations. IBLI project partners identified this as a topic for 
further exploration.
IBLI has also worked carefully with stakeholders to offer 
products that are culturally and socially acceptable to the 
region’s farmers. For example, they have pioneered Africa’s 
first Islamic compliant index insurance product. In 2013, 
30 women and 71 men in arid and semi-arid Wajir became 
the first beneficiaries of livestock insurance that conforms 
to the Islamic concept of “takaful” in which risks are shared 
among a group of participants. Through a contract called 
tabbaru (donation), participants make contributions to a risk 
fund. In the case of a payout, the fund makes payments 
commensurate with the contributions received (Macmillan 
2014). 
One unique aspect of IBLI is the major role that scientific 
research has played in its creation and scale-up. The index 
is based on extensive research on livestock viability in the 
Horn of Africa (Chantarat et al. 2009), which then linked with 
social research on the best way to communicate insurance 
to farmers (McPeak et al. 2010). The project’s approach to 
monitoring and evaluation has aided this learning process. 
The IBLI pilot from 2010 was implemented in connection with 
a rigorous impact evaluation, employing random sampling of 
households in IBLI-access locations, and control locations 
where IBLI is not available (Janzen and Carter 2013). A 
survey of more than 900 households in Marsabit provided a 
baseline of key livelihood indicators. The households were 
then re-surveyed annually to assess the economic and welfare 
impacts of the insurance product. Focus group discussions 
allows for pastoralist feedback to be incorporated into 
the product (Chantarat et al. 2013). This strong scientific 
background, together with the wide spatial coverage and low 
cost of satellite vegetation data, has allowed the partners to 
develop a product for a non-traditional insurance client that 
has the potential to be commercially sustainable. 
As with the R4 Initiative, finding innovative methods of 
addressing a lack of data has been a key part of IBLI, as the 
project is active in an area of Kenya without good mobile 
phone reception, severely limiting its ability to connect with 
mobile services such as M-PESA. The project has recently 
decided to develop an open-source ICT-based platform that 
will be used for both sales and information dissemination. It 
will use mobile phone technology to collect premiums and 
provide indemnity payments, to send messages to the insured 
clients and the sales agents on the status of the index, and to 
send product-related information such as upcoming sales or 
payouts (Wandera et al. 2013). Due to limited phone reception 
in the region, the system will be able to operate offline. 
As with the other case studies, the IBLI project has shown 
evidence of flexible learning practices. For example, in 2012 
lessons from the initial phases of the project were used to 
design improved IBLI products, better targeted to the needs 
of the pastoralists. This allowed IBLI to launch a product in the 
Borana zone of southern Ethiopia, while scaling up existing 
operations in Kenya. The new focus on the Takaful Islamic 
insurance product shows the programme’s ability to adapt to 
new markets and stakeholders, allowing IBLI to expand its 
clientele base in a region where remote pastoral communities 
are difficult to reach, have very little access to technology and 
are not necessarily familiar with the concept of insurance. (IBLI 
News 2014). 
Education has also played a large role in the IBLI scheme. 
One of the main challenges is the difficulty in reaching remote 
pastoral communities who often have little or no experience 
with insurance. To combat this, IBLI team has used insurance 
simulation games, “edu-tainment” videos, radio programmes 
and plays (McPeak et al. 2010). Pictorials and educational 
posters have played a big role in educating the communities 
on the product. In addition, some members of the community 
- endorsed by the community leaders - have been recruited 
and trained on the product through local NGOs. These 
community representatives have then been able to lead the 
explanations of the product.
In summary, IBLI has been able to introduce index-based 
insurance for livestock in eastern Africa, overcoming several 
technological, structural and financial challenges. The use of 
satellite information calibrated with livestock mortality data has 
enabled this asset protection, even when historical livestock 
mortality data were not available. Moreover, adapting the index 
design process to incorporate client feedback has enabled a 
more client-driven process that the pastoral communities may 
be more willing to trust, mixed in with robust research and 
validation studies. 
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Can index insurance for 
vulnerable farmers go to scale?
The viability of index-based insurance for poor smallholder 
farmers (including pastoralists) in the developing world is 
a topic of ongoing debate. Several reviews of the status of 
index-based agricultural insurance have focused on potential 
ways that existing initiatives – most at a pilot scale – might 
be strengthened and expanded (e.g., Hellmuth et al. 2009; 
Hazel et al. 2010; World Bank 2011b). Citing both theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence available at the time, others 
have expressed concern that demand seems to be weak 
among relatively poor smallholder farmers and pastoralists 
who are most vulnerable to weather-related risk and may limit 
the potential impact of index-based insurance (Giné et al. 
2008; Cole et al. 2013; Biswanger-Mkhize 2012). The case 
studies that we reviewed offer evidence that is relevant to this 
debate. 
A theoretical argument for expecting demand to be weak 
among poorer, vulnerable farmers is that the gain in farmers’ 
expected utility from smoothing consumption through 
index insurance is often not sufficient to cover the premium 
(Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Clarke 2011; Mirinda and Farrin 
2012). Expected utility attempts to capture how risk aversion 
affects how an individual values the tradeoff between 
mean and variability of stochastic returns (e.g., income, 
consumption), by incorporating a non-linear utility function 
(Pratt 1964). This argument assumes that insurance does 
not significantly change a farmer’s choice of production 
technology or resulting average income. However, improving 
access to credit and adoption of improved production 
technology are explicit objectives of the India (WBCIS and 
NAIS), ACRE and the R4 programmes. Available evidence 
suggests that these index insurance programmes do have 
a positive effect on adoption of more profitable production 
technologies. In the R4 initative in Ethiopia, insurance allowed 
farmers to increase their savings, or to invest more in inputs 
such as fertilizers and improved seeds (Madajewicz et al. 
2013). Similarly, a randomized control experiment in Andhra 
Pradesh, India, showed that weather index insurance, 
associated with WBCIS, prompted a shift toward more 
profitable, higher risk farm production systems (Cole et al. 
2013). The ACRE project reported that insured farmers had 
16% more earnings and invested 19% more compared to 
their uninsured neighbours (ACRE 2014).
The scale of existing insurance schemes across the 
developing world is very small relative to the numbers of 
smallholder farmers who are impacted by climate-related 
risk. Based on statistics presented in Hess and Hazell (2009), 
Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) noted that as of 2009 only three 
unsubsidized index insurance schemes reached more than 
10,000 farmers, all in India. The agricultural index insurance 
landscape is however changing rapidly. Four of the schemes 
that we reviewed have scaled up rapidly between 2009 and 
2013, the most recent year of available data across all case 
studies (Table 2). Three of these – ACRE, R4 and IBLIP – 
insured roughly 227,000 farmers and pastoralists in 2013 
without direct premium subsidy. 
Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) highlighted three other aspects 
of scale, beyond the aggregate number of farmers covered 
within a given scheme, that are important for understanding 
the potential for index-based insurance to impact poverty 
among smallholder farmers: (a) the proportion of eligible 
farmers who purchase insurance, (b) the relative economic 
status of farmers that chose to purchase insurance, and (c) 
the amount of coverage that farmers purchase. Each aspect 
of scale is considered below. 
The proportion of eligible farmers purchasing insurance is 
often difficult to measure outside randomized controlled 
trial conditions, as it is often hard to measure the number of 
farmers who have access to the product. Yet the reviewed 
case studies do offer some evidence. In India, as of the 
2012-2013 agricultural year, the 33.4 million farmers insured 
under WBCIS and NAIS represent 24% of India’s 138 million 
“operational holdings” reported in the 2010-2011 India 
Agricultural Census (Ministry of Agriculture 2014). This was 
achieved in a setting where insurance is required to obtain 
3. Discussion 
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Programme
Farmers insured
2009 2013
WBCIS 309,000 13,620,582
ACRE 185 187,456
R4/HARITA 200 20,365
IBLIP 5620 19,455
Table 2. Increases in numbers of farmers insured from 2009 
to 2013
22
 
agricultural credit, and where premiums are subsidized by 
the government. In the R4 Initiative, the uptake rate in 2013 
was 29% of the population across villages where insurance 
was offered, and up to 38% in some villages (Madajewicz 
2013). Yet demand for insurance among very poor farmers 
who opt to use labour to purchase insurance, has exceeded 
project resources. In 2014, the first year that R4 offered index 
insurance in Senegal, 66% of the 3000 farmers that were 
approached, purchased contracts. 
Whether these uptake rates are interpreted as positive or 
negative evidence depends on expectations. Although 
20-40% take-up rates of unsubsidized index insurance 
achieved in some projects may be considered low by some 
researchers, these rates exceed typical take-up rates of 
unsubsidized conventional insurance in industrialized countries 
such as the USA (Glauber, 2004). For example, for the IBLIP 
product in Mongolia might be considered low by some at 
between 9-13% of the market. However, this was enough 
to attract enough commercial reinsurance and insurance 
companies to transition the project from being donor-funded 
to a commercial entity (Yadamsuren 2014). Our view is 
that index insurance is not likely to be appropriate for every 
farmer, but its appropriateness will depend on the risks they 
face, their farming system, and what other resources are 
already available (e.g., technologies, markets, information and 
advisory services, informal risk sharing mechanisms). The goal 
therefore of index-based insurance should be to meaningfully 
address risk-related bottlenecks to improving farmers’ 
livelihoods, and not necessarily maximize uptake. 
This review includes examples that have effectively addressed 
a second concern about scaling – that, among eligible 
farmers, the relatively poor farmers who would benefit 
the most are not usually among the purchasers. The R4 
Initative, in particular, has successfully targeted very poor 
farmers, using innovations such as insurance-for-work to 
make insurance accessible to the poorer farmers within the 
project’s target population. A recent assessment showed 
that quantifiable livelihood benefits from insurance are well 
distributed, and currently benefit women farmers as much 
or more than men – possibly as a result of the gender-
targeted savings and risk-reduction components of R4 
(Madajewicz 2013). The IBLI project also targets an extremely 
poor population of pastoralists in Kenya, with measured 
development impacts distributed well among marginal sub-
populations. In Marsabit, women purchased 40% of insurance 
contracts (ILRI 2014). At least one study in India indicated that 
insurance was purchased preferentially by marginal and small 
farmers (Zevenbergen 2014; Figure 2). Current evidence in 
the IBLIP case study in Mongolia shows that although wealthy 
farmers are more likely to purchase insurance, in 2013, 15% 
of poorer farmers still decided to purchase contracts (Bertram-
Hümmer and Krähnert 2015). Insurance uptake by poorer 
farmers was also seen to improve in regions with good local 
governance or support systems (Addison and Brown 2014).
The final scale-related concern is that farmers generally buy 
the smallest amount of coverage offered. While this appears to 
be the case in some projects, the R4 Initiative shows that this 
is not necessarily the case. The poor farmers that participate 
in the R4 Initiative have demanded more aggressive insurance 
packages, purchasing as much as five times the minimum 
insurance offered despite the higher premium cost (Norton et 
al. 2014). 
The case studies that we reviewed provide evidence that 
index-based insurance can benefit significant numbers of 
smallholder farmers in the developing world. While we do 
not yet have enough evidence to project how much they can 
continue to scale up, rapid scaling in recent years suggests 
that these case studies have targeted substantial latent 
demand, and are effectively addressing the challenges to 
providing useful insurance to smallholder farmers at scale. 
In our opinion, the growth we have seen in recent years 
suggests the possibility that the uptake and benefits of index-
based insurance may be constrained more by the evolving 
capacity to provide relevant services, than by a fundamental 
lack of demand among farmers. At a minimum, it calls for 
reassessment of some of the prior arguments that lack of 
demand and practical implementation challenges prevent 
index-based insurance from being a useful tool to reduce rural 
poverty. 
Attributes of successful index 
insurance programmes
Although each of the case studies has a very different scope, 
target market and geographical location, there are some 
themes running through all of the case studies.
Insurance that increases farmers’ income
In most of the case studies, index insurance has unlocked 
opportunities for farmers to make more money, or to 
show some other clear and tangible benefit such as asset 
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protection, increased access to services such as credit, or 
increased food security in bad years.
As discussed above, a theme across many of the projects 
is that the insurance is specifically designed to unlock a 
productive opportunity for farmers that was previously 
unattractive because of risk. The increased profit from 
this opportunity provides a value for the insurance, and a 
mechanism to pay the premiums. As reported in the general 
discussion above, the use of insurance as a tool to help 
increase productivity is central to many of the case studies. 
For example the ACRE project focuses on using insurance 
as part of a productivity-enhancing package, in some cases 
linked to seed sales, in other cases for loans. Even though 
the R4 Initiative has no compulsory links to new practices or 
credit, the availability of these other R4 themes has allowed 
farmers to invest in new technologies or savings. The IBLI 
project showed that farmers who participated were better 
able to manage existing assets. The compulsory link between 
agricultural credit and insurance in India has also reinforced 
the access of credit and insurance for farmers.
Holistic approaches 
Many of the case studies have integrated index insurance 
into broader programmes for development and climate risk 
management. 
Strongly entwined with the above theme is that insurance 
has not been used as a stand-alone product, instead it 
has been located within a more comprehensive climate 
risk management portfolio. In each case-study, index 
insurance has been used to target a clearly defined risk, 
such as drought, complemented by other risk management 
approaches that might be more appropriate to address more 
frequent, less severe events. Farmers also face multiple risks 
and constraints, thus appropriate risk assessment and context 
analysis have been shown to be an important prerequisite 
to designing suitable products in each case study. In all of 
the cases, insurance has also formed the last component 
of a climate risk management plan, only used to transfer 
risk that cannot be reduced in any other way. In the Indian 
and ACRE case studies, this has been achieved by formal 
bundling to credit or improved inputs. Bundling tools has the 
added advantage of exposing farmers to insurance who might 
not have normally purchased the product. In R4, a holistic 
approach is at the core of the programme - insurance is 
purposefully only one component of a larger risk management 
system which includes risk reduction through better 
agronomic practices, prudent risk taking by access credit, and 
improved risk reserves through access to savings.  As part 
of this project, Norton et al. (2012, 2014) found that farmers 
showed increased demand if insurance was linked to other 
risk management strategies. 
IBLIP shows another approach to holistic risk management, 
as a combination of self-insurance, market-based insurance 
and a social safety net, promoted alongside other risk 
management tools in the World Bank’s Sustainable Livelihood 
Programme. These other risk management tools were 
included in IBLIP because research showed that improved 
techniques in husbandry – for example, strategic locations of 
winter fodder stores – ameliorated the insurance risk. Their 
multi-stage programme also meant that allowed risk to be 
more comprehensively managed. For example, herders bear 
the cost of small losses that do not affect the viability of their 
business, larger losses are transferred to the private insurance 
industry and the final layer of catastrophic loss is borne by the 
Government of Mongolia. 
Identifying and implementing these holistic risk management 
solutions in a new location is rarely something that one 
party can do alone. Instead, the case-studies have shown 
that success requires close collaboration between farmers, 
businesses, policy makers, scientists and implementers, 
where all the parties must have a good understanding of all 
the products, trade-offs, solutions and limitations. Taking the 
time to address these project management challenges to build 
strong inter-organizational relationships is a valuable strategy 
echoed in all of the case studies.
Farmer-driven design 
Many of the case studies have reported substantial benefits 
from involving end-clients in the index design process.
In one sense, index is more difficult to administer than 
traditional indemnity insurance because it cannot cover all 
losses and risks. Identifying a clear, obvious and measurable 
risk is therefore a key aspect of setting up an index insurance 
programme, especially for weather-based indices which are a 
level further removed from loss than area yield indices. Farmer-
driven design is one method of bridging this distance and 
has been credited as key to scaling in many cases studies. 
All of the projects that engaged in meaningful discussions 
with farmers reported large benefits to index design and 
uptake. For example, recent work has shown that playing 
experimental games in the R4/HARITA project significantly 
increased demand for the product (Norton et al. 2014). The 
R4 project considers the use of the games so important that 
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they use the first year in a country as a ‘dry run’, where the 
insurance can be tested and discussed with farmers before 
it is formally purchased. Another example of farmer-driven 
design is in the Islamic insurance product developed by IBLI 
that was designed specifically to address the needs of farmers 
who couldn’t take up a standard insurance contract. In India, 
a recent impact review (Zevenbergen 2014) reported that 
becoming more involved in the design process was the most 
requested improvement by farmers in the NAIS programme. It 
also reported extremely high uptake in a community-designed 
trial project in the region, particularly because it opened up 
formal avenues for feedback and validation. 
It is important to note that farmer-led design does not mean 
that local and international experts were ignored in the case 
studies; instead their expertise was shown to be crucial. All of 
the case studies included regional and international experts to 
better understand the relevant agronomic, climatic, economic 
and statistical background of the target area region.
Building trust and capacity
Education and capacity development proved a key aspect of 
many case studies.
Unlike a loan, insurance is a promise for a payment later for a 
premium paid now and as such, trust is inherently at the core 
of the process. In parallel, the ability of farmers to understand 
and discuss the product being offered is an important 
method of building demand. Unsurprisingly, partnering with 
organizations that have already built trust and capacity within 
the clients was instrumental for successful scale-up of the 
case studies. In the case of formal bundling, ACRE and 
the Indian insurance projects partnered with companies or 
institutions already trusted by partners and clients. This was 
particularly the case for the link between ACRE and M-PESA 
mobile banking, which allowed farmers to pay for insurance 
and receive payouts in a well-understood and trusted manner. 
The R4, IBLIP and ILRI projects have also partnered with 
NGOs and initiatives that are well respected by the community. 
A specific focus on education building has also played a 
key role in building trust and demand. In the R4 project, this 
was achieved through working with farmers on index design 
using games and community discussions. IBLIP reported 
that its increase in demand was in part because of intensive 
information campaigns supported by the Government of 
Mongolia (Mahul and Stutley 2010) and awareness was 
quoted as one of the key constraints to scaling further. 
Education also plays a large role in IBLI where the project 
reported successful use of insurance simulation games, 
educational videos, radio programmes, plays and cartoon 
strips as educational tools (McPeak et al. 2010). In India, 
Kakumanu (2011) showed that a significant factor in a farmer’s 
willingness to buy the WBCIS plan was the impact of a large-
scale awareness programme run by AIC. Finally in the ACRE 
programme, in 2011 it was reported that 40% of the project’s 
budget went towards paying for trainers who work with 
farmers, a telephone helpline and radio programmes about 
insurance. Education about new agricultural practices was 
also a formal part of the bundle.
Developing markets, supply chains, and 
logistical support systems
Insurance projects that have scaled have also invested in 
policy frameworks, supply chain integration and market 
integration. 
One important aspect of many of the case studies was the 
ability of implementers to work in advance with policy makers, 
market leaders and businesses to develop supply chains 
and legislative frameworks. Some of this focus is on building 
supply chains for the insurance itself, for example ACRE has 
built close links to M-PESA mobile banking and IBLI is now 
starting to invest in technologies that can work outside the 
mobile phone network to allow insurance coverage to be 
easily bought and tracked.
In addition to engaging insurance supply chains, providing 
access to and supply chains for productive assets attached 
to the insurance has proven equally important. This was a well 
reported barrier in early index insurance projects. For example 
in 2005, the World Bank led a project in Malawi that provided 
an excellent example of how index insurance might be used in 
a development context. Although farmers paid the complete 
cost of the insurance, inputs, loans, interest and even tax, 
demand for the product outstripped the project capacity and 
swamped the supply chain, which led to the total size of an 
otherwise successful project being capped at 1000-2000 
farmers (Hellmuth 2009). In the case studies reported here, the 
scale up of the R4 project is currently limited by its ability to 
sign up people to the insurance-for-labour part of the project, 
rather than farmer demand for the product. ACRE and the 
Indian insurance programmes work in close consultation with 
microfinance institutions and credit companies to provide 
additional access and supply chains.  
Finally, building the legislative landscape for insurance is 
equally important to be able to give insurance the space to 
scale. Both IBLIP and the Indian projects are working in close 
conjunction with national governments to develop supportive 
legislative frameworks and in Ethiopia, the R4 project is 
operating at a large scale using the well-established PSNP 
project run by the Government of Ethiopia. In all of the case 
studies, linking formally with the government was crucial in 
transitioning insurance from a fixed time-scale pilot into a 
sustainable large-scale system. 
Scaling up index insurance for smallholder farmers
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Solid science, technology, and basis risk
Solid scientific research and good communication allowed 
many of the case studies to scale, especially when addressing 
data poverty or reducing the impact of basis risk.
Finally, basing index insurance projects on robust scientific 
output and working closely with research organizations has 
been a core theme of many of the case studies, allowing 
them to use agro-meteorological research and knowledge 
to quantify basis risk and social science research to aid 
communication with farmers.
Many of the projects highlighted in this report have stressed 
the importance of building a project on solid scientific 
knowledge, aiming to balance technological innovation with 
statistically robust products that are understandable by 
farmers. Modern scientific research is key in almost all aspects 
of index design, from dealing with data sparse environments, 
to new datasets such as indexes based on remote sensing, 
to modelling and understanding climate trends, to quantifying 
uncertainties. For example in the IBLI and R4 projects, 
physical scientists, social scientists and economists have been 
involved since project conception.
Many of the case studies have shown that addressing the 
issue of data poverty is vital for scaling. In many developing 
countries there are limited agronomic or meteorological data 
for index design e.g., limited crop yield data or rain gauge 
networks. One method of overcoming this is to use remotely 
sensed data from satellites, an option that is seen in several 
of the case studies. In ACRE, a proportion of their products 
are based on the output of rainfall estimates from satellites, 
and satellite based indices are currently insuring 37, 000 
Rwandan farmers (Fiondella 2013). In the R4 Initiative, the 
index is similarly based on the output of the ARC2 satellite 
rainfall estimates, supported by information from vegetation 
remote sensing, farmer interviews, on-site validation and tools 
such as weather generators and crop simulation models. IBLI 
also uses satellites, but in this case employs an innovative 
relationship between livestock mortality and the satellite 
vegetation estimate NDVI. There is currently intensive research 
into the use of satellites (Stanimirova 2014). Current efforts 
include a project led by the Weather Risk Management Facility 
(WRMF), a joint IFAD and World Food Programme (WFP) 
initiative to support the sustainable development of weather 
risk-management instruments in developing countries. This is 
currently examining the feasibility, accuracy, and reliability of 
seven satellite remote sensing-derived approaches in index 
insurance design, including vegetation, evapotranspiration, 
soil-moisture and rainfall datasets. In addition a NASA-
led collaboration is exploring the potential of new satellite 
technologies such as active/passive sensing of soil moisture in 
current and future index insurance projects. Plus researching 
mobile data collection and information transfer mechanisms 
for multiple user groups (Mann and Stanimirova 2014).
Basis risk, or the differences between a payout and a farmer’s 
actual loss, is sometimes quoted as a key constraint for 
index insurance and many of the design processes discussed 
above are dedicated to finding statistically robust indices 
with low basis risk. While it is impossible to entirely eliminate 
basis risk from index insurance products, a lot of effort has 
been spent minimizing it through careful index selection, and 
contract design that maps the index data to historical as 
well as anticipated patterns of losses (Norton et al. 2014). In 
India, there has also been a lot of work done on studying and 
validating basis risk events (Clarke et al. 2012). In Mongolia, 
basis risk has been minimized by working using average 
reported livestock mortality rates rather than assuming that 
some proxy such as rainfall could better model losses. This is 
possible in IBLIP due to the cultural importance of reporting 
the correct number of livestock losses, the existing framework 
in place to do so and the very long nature of the historical 
data (~100 years). The R4 and IBLI projects have dedicated 
significant amounts of time to minimizing basis risk events 
through examining multiple data sources.
Alongside basis risk reduction, another theme running 
through the case studies is the importance of basis risk 
communication. Projects such as R4 have spent significant 
resources on discussing what a community might do in a 
basis risk event. They are working towards a situation where 
farmers will no longer see the event as a failure, rather as a 
year where they need to take Option B (e.g., use a community 
savings fund or their savings at the MFI). 
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4. Conclusion 
Although agricultural insurance has a long heritage with 
significant ongoing investment, it has only started to become 
more widely applied across the developing world in recent 
years, driven in part by innovations in index-based insurance. 
There still remains much to learn from the successes and 
failures of existing initiatives. This report demonstrates that 
despite the challenges, there are index insurance programmes 
that have made recent advances in scaling up services for 
relatively poor smallholder farmers and pastoralists in the 
developing world, with demonstrable benefits. For example, 
India’s index-based insurance programmes (NAIS and WBCIS) 
have reached tens of millions of farmers through their link 
with agricultural credit and strong government support. 
ACRE in East Africa has proven that it is possible to engage 
hundreds of thousands of farmers in just a few years and that 
it is possible to capitalize and partner with new technological 
initiatives such as M-PESA mobile banking. The R4 Rural 
Resilience Initiative in Ethiopia and Senegal has shown that it 
is possible to use unsubsidized, unbundled index insurance as 
one component of a comprehensive risk management portfolio 
to reach over 20,000 smallholder famers who were previously 
considered uninsurable. The Mongolian IBLIP project has 
demonstrated how a strong public-private partnership can 
sustainably reach over 15,000 nomadic herders. Other smaller 
projects, such as the IBLI case study, are also starting to 
fill important niches in climate risk management for smaller 
communities that face particular challenges. 
The case studies considered in this report target a wide range 
of groups, in very different parts of the world, yet there are still 
many similarities and themes running across them. We hope 
these similarities provide encouragement for other insurance 
projects hoping to grow to a scale that might meaningfully 
address poverty. The factors that appear to be contributing 
to their recent progress are generally consistent with 
earlier assessments. These include investigations into new 
technologies (particularly remote sensing) to address index 
design, basis risk and validation questions, holistic linkages 
to supply chains and other risk management initiatives, plus 
solid farmer-driven design based on a robust assessment 
of the risks they are facing. Most importantly, all of the case 
studies appear to unlock opportunities for farmers to make 
more money, or to show some other clear and tangible 
benefit such as asset protection, increased access to services 
such as credit, or increased food security in bad years. The 
case studies show that achieving maturity in any insurance 
programme takes time, careful planning and attention to 
detail; success cannot be achieved overnight. It is equally 
important to note the differences between the case studies, as 
agricultural practices and risks in developing countries are very 
diverse and any single index insurance ‘success story’ cannot 
be universally adopted. The case studies have also shown 
that index insurance is not going to be appropriate in every 
circumstance and that there are still several challenges still to 
overcome, including data management, basis risk, logistical 
and client communication. 
Although the scale of existing insurance schemes across the 
developing world remains very small relative to the numbers 
of smallholder farmers who are impacted by climate-related 
risk, the agricultural index insurance landscape is changing 
rapidly. While there are still many obstacles to overcome, the 
emerging picture is encouraging. Rapid scaling observed in 
a few of the case studies we reviewed indicates that they 
have targeted substantial latent demand among smallholder 
farmers and pastoralists, and are effectively addressing the 
challenges to providing useful insurance in a manner that is 
scalable. These case studies also provide updated evidence 
that counters significant concern, based on earlier surveys of 
the state of index insurance, that lack of demand may prevent 
index-based insurance from becoming an effective tool to 
reduce rural poverty at a meaningful scale. Instead, it suggests 
the possibility that the uptake and benefits of index-based 
insurance may have been constrained more by the evolving 
capacity to provide relevant services than by a fundamental 
lack of demand among farmers, and that continued effort 
is worthwhile. We expect that what happens in some of the 
stronger agricultural insurance initiatives over the next few 
years will resolve this debate, and strengthen the evidence 
base needed to inform appropriate investment in insurance for 
smallholder agriculture in the developing world. 
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